Germany has realized tremendous growth rates in the aftermath of the Second World War. Since the early 1970s, growth rates declined and settled down at a more or less constant rate of 2% per year, only to experience a renewed negative trend around the early 2000s. Estimating GMM growth models in a panel of 187 countries between 1970 and 2010, we illustrate that large parts of historical welfare increases have emerged due to conditional convergence, human capital accumulation, and innovation activity. Whereas conditional convergence was the main driver behind the extraordinary postwar growth rates in Germany, human capital accumulation in Germany currently lags behind the average level of most developed countries. While this may explain the moderate position of Germany in the group of the 25 richest countries, the developed countries on their part are experiencing a period of belowaverage GDP growth. In nearly all advanced economies, growth reveals a downward trend since the turn of the millennium. We argue that this decline must be traced back to a general lack of radically new ideas in the world economy. The explanation of the German growth crisis may thus be considered a blueprint of the situation in developed economies.
. Per capita growth rates and trend in Germany, 1950 -2013f. Data: Eurostat (2013 , Heston et al. (2012) , Maddison (2013) , and own calculations. The growth rate for 2013 is forecast by Eurostat.
Introduction: The Problem
After the Second World War, the German economy realized income increases that do not seem to be reproducible today. Figure 1 illustrates the development of the German growth rate and its trend from 1950 to 2010. While per capita income in the 1950s and the 1960s grew by an average of 8.3 and 4.5% per year, these increases have declined significantly since the end of the 1960s. Between the early 1970s and the late 1990s, growth rates settled down to a more or less stable level. However, since the beginning of the new millennium, the downswing of the trend has sharpened once more. During the 2000s, income grew by only 1.2% per annum.
This phenomenon is not only specific to Germany, but can be identified in almost all developed countries. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the average growth rate of the 25 most affluent countries in terms of per capita GDP and its trend from 1970 to 2010. 1 Astonishingly, the development of per capita growth mimics the growth path of Germany quite accurately. After a period of high increases of per capita income during the 1970s, growth rates decreased until they achieved a more or less stable level at the end of the 1970s. In the early 1990s, average growth in the top 25 countries increased tremendously. These above-average gains, however, are driven almost entirely by Equatorial Guinea. In 1990, income per capita was USD652.60 and rose up to USD5,935.89 in 2000 . Incomes during the 1990s increased almost tenfold due to the discovery of new oil reserves.
Around the year 2000, however, growth in the top 25 countries exhibited a renewed negative trend. Figure A .1 in the appendix illustrates the trend of growth rates of each of the 25 richest countries in the world in terms of per capita income. With the exception of the oil-exporting countries Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, all developed countries experienced a more or less comparable decline in growth around the year 2000. Excluding oil-exporting economies (Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates), the mean value of growth in the top 25 countries was 3.1% in the 1970s, 2.3% in the 1980s, 2.1% in the 1990s and 1.3% in the 2000s.
The aim of this paper is to explain the development of the German growth rate since the beginning of the 1950s and the particular noteworthy decline since the new millennium. As we will demonstrate, most of our explanation also holds for the entire group of developed economies, transforming the German problem into a blueprint of the current situation in most advanced economies. The paper proceeds as follows. First, we briefly outline the main drivers of long-run economic growth from neoclassical and endogenous growth theory. These are conditional convergence, innovations, and human capital. The consideration will facilitate a better understanding of the empirical data and further illustrates the mutual dependence of human capital and research activities. In Section 3, we empirically explore the main drivers of economic growth by applying GMM estimations in a sample of 187 countries between 1970 and 2010. This investigation illustrates that improvements in human capital endowment and research activities have indeed contributed to large parts of historical growth rates. Moreover, conditional convergence emerges as a clear empirical pattern. This prompts us to draw two conclusions: first, the relevant time span when investigating German growth rates is 1970-2010, as Germany experienced significant convergence effects after the Second World War that did not fade until the late 1960s. Second, German growth may only be compared with developed countries that in turn have approximated their individual steady state level of growth. We thus analyze the key drivers of growth in a sample of the 25 richest countries in terms of per capita income.
Our investigation shows that Germany lags far behind in the accumulation of human capital. Human capital, however, is a direct input factor in the production function and furthermore is necessary to close the technological gap, that is the transfer of scientific research into marketable goods and production processes. This innovation activity is the main driver in numerous endogenous growth models. Yet the technological frontier that provides the potential for new products is subject to strong fluctuations over time. Gordon (2012) has recently argued that faltering innovations led to a longlasting decline in US growth. Our analysis supports this appraisal, suggesting that the worldwide innovation activity has slowed since the early 2000s. This lag of radically new ideas led to below-average growth rates in most of the developed countries. The combination of the weak gains in human capital and the worldwide 'idea gap' explains large parts of the evolution of historical growth rates in Germany since the early 1970s. Moreover, several of the developments in Germany are symptomatic for a number of advanced economies. We conclude in Section 4.
Conditional Convergence, Human Capital and Innovations
One crucial hypothesis of the neoclassical growth model of Solow (1956) , Swan (1956) , Koopmans (1965) and Cass (1965) is convergence. The model demonstrates that poor economies will eventually catch up to rich countries and that per capita incomes converge. Similarly, the model predicts that the growth rate of any economy declines as it approximates its steady state. Empirical results indicate that the starting position and the growth rate are negatively correlated when holding constant some variables that distinguish the countries. Therefore, reconciling the convergence hypothesis with data necessitates examining the concept of conditional convergence. The works of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) , Barro (2003 Barro ( , 2013 and Mankiw et al. (1992) indeed demonstrate that poorer countries grow faster than economies that have approached their steady state.
Once the steady state level of income is reached, economies can no longer grow by accumulation of physical capital. The endogenous models of Romer (1986 Romer ( , 1987 Romer ( , 1990 , Lucas (1988) , Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) illustrate that the accumulation of human capital as well as vertical and horizontal innovations are the main drivers of the steady state growth rate.
The representation of Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) vividly brings to expression the various facets of human capital h, considering h a function of family input F, individual abilities A, schooling quality q, schooling quantity Y and other relevant factors Z that include health and labor market experience. This yields
where λ, φ, η, α ∈ R + denominate the marginal impacts of the particular determinant. As family input and individual abilities can hardly -if at allbe improved, schooling quality and quantity as well as health are the most important factors that distinguish the countries. The decision of individuals to invest in one unit of these factors of human capital at any time t can be described, similar to Johnes (1993) 
(1) C(t) denotes the costs of achieving one marginal unit of human capital, R(t) entitles the rent of the educational program, Q refers to the time at which the training program is completed and T marks the time of retirement. Low costs of education, low interest rates, high returns to education and a young population thus lead to positive growth stimuli. Any investigation considering the level of human capital in advanced economies therefore has to shade light on the evolution of these factors. Contiguous to human capital, the innovation activity is the primary driver of long-run economic growth in endogenous growth models. The classical idea of Schumpeter (1911) is that inventions are created regularly over time, whereas innovations -concrete and marketable applications of these discoveries -emerge discontinuously over the course of time. The reason for this divergence is that innovations are far more costly and risky than improvements of existing products. Whenever a sufficiently large bundle of innovations j allows for a wide range of improvements κ j , firms are likely to improve existing capital goods rather than invest in entirely new products. Yet as the improvement gets more and more costly with each step on the quality ladder, the development costs of κ j will approach the additional returns and eventually exceed it. In such a situation, the incentives to invest in new inventions rise. At some point in time, less risk-averse entrepreneurs will introduce new j * that close the gap between the research front and the amount of marketable capital goods.
As human capital and innovations exert a significant influence on growth, there is a close link between the evolution of both of these factors. Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) illustrate the interaction between the technological front and factor productivity. In these models, technological progress is positively correlated with the closing of the gap between the technological front and the stock of factor productivity. The rate at which this gap is closed depends on the level of human capital, multiplied by the fraction of h working in the research sector, that is μh. Let T(t) be the exogenously given theoretical technological level that measures the stock of knowledge or body of techniques available to innovators. Suppose that ω denominates the time lag between the invention and its adoption. On an aggregate level, the technology used in practice on average equals the technological front ω years ago. It follows that
Endogenous growth models with an expanding variety of products indicate that enhancements of factor productivity will boost the creation of j * as it increases the net present value of the innovation. Thus, any investment in j * (or κ j ) is more likely to produce profits exceeding the marginal costs of the innovation. In addition, factor productivity increases enable designs of new capital goods that could not have been made with the old technology. Even more important, an increase in (t) facilitates the accumulation of human capital in the Lucas (1988) model and therefore accelerates the closing of the technological gap. Older models often expect T(t) to evolve at a more or less constant exponential rate of ϕ > 0. However, this quite restrictive assumption has been cast into doubt in recent years. Some inventions can be considered pathbreaking, while others increase the level of T(t) only exiguously. The impact of some inventions is so strong that they allow for a multiplicity of adoptions, and have a protracted influence on all industries. These inventions are called 'general purpose technologies' (GPTs). 2 In the model of Nelson and Phelps (1966) , the invention of these technologies leads to an instantaneous leap of the technological front. This augments the technological gap and creates a large potential for factor productivity gains, given that the stock of human capital is sufficiently large enough to master the new technologies.
Innovation activities create an increase in the stock of basic knowledge as a by-product and enhance the productivity of future research. This increase is freely available to all researchers, allows for no partial excludability and is non-rival in its utilization. Due to disembodied technological know-how flows, technological progress in one country augments the technological level of a second country, given that these countries are in interaction with each other. International trade and openness therefore enhance and boost growth. Whenever the theoretical technological level rises, growth potentials emerge through two channels: first, technological inventions increase the potential for productivity gains. Enhancements of productivity have a direct effect on per capita growth, as the output can be produced more efficiently. Second, technological inventions allow for marketable adoptions and thus trigger a growth stimulus in endogenous growth models with an expanding variety of products. These additional capital goods in turn enable improvements and variations κ j , which further increase the output.
Radical innovations have strong impacts on growth, while their absence leads to periods with disproportionate gains of per capita income. The diffusion of a new technology j * by a specific firm can be formulated similar to Petsas (2003) , using an epidemic model of the functional forṁ
whereπ(t) ≡ dπ/dt gives the change of the fraction of industries using the new technology and φ denominates the rate of diffusion. More generally, π (t) = φπ(t) [ − π(t)] describes the approximation to any upper limit . 3 Disregarding the time index for reasons of lucidity, the diffusion of technology in (2) is very slow if π in relation to the upper limit is small. However, the speed of diffusion rises (approximately) exponentially up to a certain point. For high degrees of saturation, the marginal rate of diffusion converts to zero. The solution of (2) provides the fraction of industries using a new technology as a function of time. This function owns a sigmoid shape that can be described by
where γ denotes the integration constant. 4 In t → ∞, each industry uses the new technology. The first derivative of equation (3) gives the growth rate of π. Consider that the new technology benefits each industry to the same extent. Suppose, further, that within each industry, there is a comparable fraction of entrepreneurs to potentially carry out improvements or variations κ j * . Then the development of the amount of improvements follows the growth rate of diffusion π . Figure 3 illustrates this process. Depending on the assumption, the functional form can be based on various members of the class of sigmoid functions. However, the theoretical considerations may set an argument for a right-skewed Gompertz specification. This is because the potentials for improvements may never run out completely but may become increasingly irrelevant as new technologies replace the vintages. The technological front T enables the introduction of j * , that is an increase in the number of capital goods. The improvements and variations following this introduction develop according to Figure 3. As described above, the extent of human capital is crucial in determining this process. Thus, the growth rate of a steady state economy is influenced by the theoretical technological level and may easily vary over time. If the technological gap is small, growth potentials are low. These situations occur whenever there is a lack of fundamentally new ideas. Romer (1993) describes such a situation as an 'idea gap'. The same result emerges for regular or even large technological gaps that are accompanied by poor rates of human capital accumulation. To estimate the growth potential currently provided by technological innovations requires empirically estimating the position of the advanced economies on the function illustrated in Figure 3 . 
Empirical Evidence: The Case of Germany
Theory emphasizes the importance of human capital and innovation activity for long-run economic growth. Moreover, one fundamental hypothesis of the standard growth model is (conditional) convergence. In this section, we provide empirical evidence that growth rates indeed tend to converge when holding constant some variables that distinguish counties. It also turns out that human capital endowment and technological progress strongly influence the steady state rate of growth. We will thus explore how these variables have evolved in Germany and compare the results with the group of the 25 richest economies in 2012.
The Empirical Determinants of Long-run Growth
The specification of our empirical model builds on Barro (2000 Barro ( , 2003 Barro ( , 2013 and Acemoglu et al. (2008) . In these models, real per capita GDP growth is assumed to be a functioṅ
where y t−τ is the logarithmic value of per capita GDP, h t−τ denominates the (initial) stock of human capital and t−τ contains a number of environment and control variables suggested by the standard growth model and endogenous theories. Each regressor is lagged by 0 < τ < 1 periods. We do not directly employ capital endowment since data on physical capital is quite unreliable as its calculation strongly depends on arbitrary assumptions about depreciation and approximated values of both initial capital endowment and investment flows. This problem is exacerbated further if developing countries are to be included. Thus, we follow Barro (2003 Barro ( , 2013 by assuming that higher levels of y and h are correlated with a larger stock of physical capital, so that the concurrence of both variables may serve as an appropriate proxy.
Controlling for some crucial growth determinants that distinguish the countries, the coefficient of y t−τ gives the rate of conditional convergence. Conditionality is of great importance, as empirical growth research -for instance Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro (2003 Barro ( , 2013 ) -suggests that the absolute convergence hypothesis of neoclassical growth theory cannot be affirmed empirically. In fact, the relation between the initial level of GDP per capita and the growth rate must be examined after holding constant some crucial variables that capture country-specific potentials for economic growth. Likewise, Atkeson and Kehoe (2000) show for the twocountry-case that the steady state is a function of initial conditions and thus deviates between the economies. For these reasons, the incorporation of country-specific state and environment variables is compulsory.
We estimate equation (4) using panel data of 187 economies between 1970 and 2010 in simultaneous equation models (SEMs). Each equation of the SEM covers a five-year period, so each equation reflects a cross-section estimation at a certain point in time. The time period covered in the estimation is 1970-2010. Thus, the SEM comprehends seven equations. This approach is determined by the long-term perspective of growth regressions, the need to smooth short-term fluctuations and the availability of data. Estimating the influence of the variables on growth using annual panel data would lead to severe biases and contradict the implications of growth theory. Yet, we contrast our results with the outcome of panel data regressions based on annual data in the sensitivity analysis.
The SEM is specified as followṡ
The specification approximates human capital using average years of schooling (YSCHOOL) and life expectancy at birth (LIFEEX). The fertility rate (FERT) accounts for the negative effect of population growth on the steadystate ratio of capital to effective worker in the standard growth model. In addition, higher rates of fertility reflect a higher fraction of resources devoted to child-rearing. The investment share INS incorporates the preferences for savings and GOVC denominates government consumption. DEM is a dummy variable that assumes 1 if the country is democratically organized and HOF is a rule of law index covering the extent of economic and political freedom. Countries with a high level of rule of law are attached with low values of HOF, so the coefficient of HOF must be interpreted conversely. In order to attend to the specific environments of Sub-Saharan and Latin American countries, we include dummy variables LATINAM for Latin American countries and SUBSAH for Sub-Saharan nations. The degree of openness (OPEN) furthermore accounts for international spillovers and the gains from trade. We are also interested in the effect of innovation activity. Thus, the specification incorporates patent applications in relation to GDP (PAT) and citations (CIT). The latter comprises the amount of citations achieved by patents granted in a country within the respective five-year interval. There is some advantage in using citations rather than patent applications, as citations more accurately reflect the quality of innovations. In addition, the tendency to register innovations at the patent office deviates between countries, especially in heterogeneous samples that cover a large number of different nations. The data sources of the variables are shown in Table A1 .1 in the Appendix. The estimation technique of the basic regression is GMM using Newey-West HAC standard errors, as autocorrelation and heterogeneity are likely to occur due to the persistence in macroeconomic time-series as well as the heterogeneous sample of 187 countries. We explicitly refrain from applying country fixed effects (FE) since this would eliminate the cross-country variation that we aim to explain with the empirical model. Yet, we will compare the outcome with an annual-based fixed effects estimation in the sensitivity analysis. Many of the regressors in equation (5) must be expected to be endogenous. In order to circumvent possible problems caused by endogeneity, we include the lagged variables of each regressor in the list of instruments. Including lagged instruments also reduces the problem of reverse causality, as the future cannot be expected to influence the past. Especially with respect to education, causality may also run in the other direction. Surplus instruments are an alternative specification of the democracy variable using continuous values DEM as well as the average years of primary schooling (PSCHOOL). Table 1 reports three versions of the baseline regression model, where each of the versions is further subdivided into a first examination covering the whole sample and second estimation including only middle and high-income countries. The classification of middle and high-income countries refers to the analytical income categories of the World Bank. Estimations that are only based on high-income countries would cause severe losses in degrees of freedom, provoking the possibility of biases in the estimations. When estimating the growth effect on middle and high-income countries, we neglect the country dummies for Latin American and Sub-Saharan countries, as both regions are sparsely represented in the high-income sub-samples.
The first version of the baseline system (entitled column 1) shows the results by disregarding innovation activity. It turns out that human capital indeed exerts an important influence on economic growth. Both school attainment and life expectancy significantly contribute to increases in per capita incomes. This influence is quite robust, as there is little variation between the whole sample and the high-income estimation. Quite the contrary, a high fertility rate significantly reduces growth. The influence of rule of law and democracy is somewhat more ambiguous. Whereas HOF does not affect growth at all in the baseline estimation, the democracy dummy possesses a negative sign. Acemoglu et al. (2008) discuss the influence of democracy on incomes in greater detail, suggesting that there may be a correlation but no causation between both variables. Furthermore, they show that historical factors appear to have shaped divergent development paths Notes: Estimation method is GMM with HAC standard errors (Newey-West), t statistics are in brackets. The dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth in the periods 1970-1975, 1975-1980, 1980-1985, 1985-1990, 1990-1995, 1995-2000, 2000-2005, 2005-2010 . Due to data availability, the included periods in columns (2) and (3) are 1975-1980, 1980-1985, 1985-1990, 1990-1995, 1995-2000, 2000-2005, 2005-2010 . Instruments are mainly lagged exogenous variables. Surplus instruments are primary school attainment PSCHOOL and the democratization index of Vanhanen, 2012. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < .001.
of economic well-being and political institutions. Likewise, Barro (1996) demonstrates that the favorable effects of democracy on growth include maintenance of the rule of law, free markets, small government consumption, and a high stock of human capital. Once these effects are held constant, democracy and growth are negatively correlated. One theoretical explanation often mentioned is that more democracy enhances growth at low levels of political freedom, but depresses income increases once a moderate level has been achieved. 5 If most of the countries were democratic at the beginning of the sample, then we may just find the latter effect in the estimation. Indeed, descriptive statistics support the negative correlation between democracy and growth, as the mean growth rate at the end of the sample (2005-2010) is 3.98 in non-democratic and 2.95 in democratic countries. The baseline results in column 1 also illustrate that higher investment shares lead to higher income increases. In addition, it turns out that Latin American and Sub-Saharan countries on average are growing more slowly than the rest of the world.
The second version of the baseline estimation is concerned with the influence of patent applications as a proxy of innovation activity. The results show that countries with a high rate of patent applications in relation to GDP are able to achieve higher income increases than economies with little innovation activity. The influence of patents increases slightly when concerning only middle and high income countries, but in general proves to be quite robust. The same effect is seen in citations achieved by countries, as illustrated in the last version of the baseline estimation in column 3. Like patents, citations increase per capita incomes. The effect of CIT is stronger in highincome countries but, similar to the innovation activity proxied by patents, the coefficient of CIT is both positive and significant in both sub-samples. While research activities obviously increase growth rates, Table 1 proves that technical knowledge does not necessarily has to be created domestically. The positive sign of international openness (OPEN) demonstrates that spillovers from abroad also lead to factor productivity enhancements. The more open an economy is, the more it can benefit from internationally available technological knowledge and the more capital goods can be used in the production of the output.
In general, the system is relatively robust across the various estimates in Table 1 . Yet the incorporation of PAT and CIT leads to more plausible results with respect to government consumption and rule of law. Columns 2 and 3 demonstrate that public expenditures that do not directly affect productivity but that entail distortions in the private sector lead to a reduction in growth. In the models that neglect innovation activity, the influence of government consumption is virtually irrelevant. One explanation of the change in the sign of government consumption may be that the spendings of various forms of government consumption may have entirely different effects. If the government increases spending on universities and schools, basic research carried out in state-funded institutions will improve and thereby boost innovation activity. Quite the contrary, if government consumption primarily intends to expand the social system, the influence on growth may be negative as the associated increase in interest rates increases the costs of private investments. When controlling for the innovation activity by incorporating CIT and PAT, GOVC only covers the negative effect of government consumption. A quite similar argument can be brought forward with respect to the rule of law index. In columns 2 and 3, HOF exhibits a negative influence, indicating that the rule of law increases growth rates owing to the reverse coding of the HOF variable. In general, HOF and innovation activities are negatively correlated (depending on the measure and the period between -10 and -20%). There is much reason to expect the rule of law to boost patent applications, as the existence of property rights increases the incentives to invest in research activities. If the regression does not control for the effect of innovations, then the coefficient of HOF is ambiguous and virtually irrelevant.
Conditional convergence emerges as a clear empirical pattern in Table 1 . In each of the regressions, the initial value of real per capita GDP significantly reduces growth rates. This means that after holding constant some crucial county-specific variables, economies with a low initial income level tend to grow faster than richer economies. Poor economies thus will eventually catch up with prosperous countries and per capita incomes converge asymptotically, even though divergent steady state levels disallow the achievement of identical income levels. The rate of convergence in Table 1 lies between -1.289 and -2.914 and is stronger when concerning only middle and high-income countries. Similar rates of conditional convergence have been reported in Barro (2003 Barro ( , 2013 , where the coefficient assumes values between -2.11 and -2.90. Likewise, this proves that advanced economies whose capital stock abruptly declines as a result of war or natural disasters are very likely to experience above-average growth rates while re-approximating the steady state.
Sensitivity Analysis
One concern of the baseline results may be that the findings are strongly influenced by the specification of the system based on 5-year averages and the utilized GMM estimator. For this reason, Table 2 investigates whether the outcome changes when applying different estimation strategies. The sensitivity regressions are divided into two branches: the first class of models illustrated in column 1 maintain the basic specification of equation (5) but apply different estimators, W2SLS and 3SLS. The second class in columns 2 and 3 explores the influence of the growth determinants in a dynamic panel based on annual data. We conduct two different forms of dynamic panel regression, GMM with Newey-West HAC standard errors and a fixed effects (FE) regression.
The alternative estimators of the basic simultaneous equation model yield results highly comparable to the outcome of the baseline regression. Conditional convergence again plays an important role in the evolution of growth rates, indicating that poor countries tend to catch up with advanced economies when holding constant some variables that distinguish the countries. Similar to the baseline results, column 1 illustrates that education and innovation activity positively contribute to growth. However, the 3SLS regression does not discover a significant impact of the average years of schooling on income increases. In addition, life expectancy and the investment share lose importance in both the W2SLS and the 3SLS estimates. Notes: t statistics are in brackets, the dependent variable in column 1 is real per capita GDP growth in the periods 1975-1980, 1980-1985, 1985-1990, 1990-1995, 1995-2000, 2000-2005, 2005-2010 . The dependent variables in columns 2 and 3 are fifth-order moving averages of annual GDP growth. Lagged exogenous variables are used as instruments. Surplus instruments are primary school attainment PSCHOOL and the democratization index of Vanhanen, 2012. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
Irrespective from these deviations, the degree of openness exerts a significant influence on growth rates, indicating that international spillovers affect welfare increases to a large extent. The baseline estimation uses 5-year averages in order to smooth cyclical fluctuations. We are deeply convinced that the applied estimation technique is best when investigating the long-run determinants of economic growth and at the same time helps to encompass the econometric problems that occur when dealing with growth rates, endogeneity, and autocorrelation. Nevertheless, we are interested in the question of whether the results remain robust when estimating the baseline with annual data. To disentangle cyclical effects from long-run growth, we use 5-year moving averages of the growth rate as the dependent variable. The time lag of y t−τ and the instruments is five years, since it cannot be expected that changes in the state affect income increases on an annual basis. Both dynamic panel estimations yield highly comparable results and strongly support the findings of the baseline results. Unlike in the regressions in column 1, the positive effect of human capital accumulation becomes clearly visible, as both school attendance as well as life expectancy significantly contribute to income increases. Moreover, column 2 supports the earlier findings that innovations and international spillovers significantly influence growth rates. The annual estimates further confirm the conditional convergence hypothesis. However, when applying fixed effects, the marginal impact of the initial income value is notably stronger. The comparison between the FE model and the panel GMM estimation also reveals that individual country effects constitute large parts of income increases, as the inclusion of fixed effects allows an explanation of 63% of the variation in growth rates, whereas R-squared in the GMM model without fixed effects is 25%. Column 3 utilizes citations rather than patent data as a proxy of innovation activity. Whereas the basic estimates strongly resemble the outcome of column 2, CIT is only significant in the panel GMM estimation.
Overall, the sensitivity analysis supports the findings of the baseline regressions. In particular, human capital, innovation activity, and international spillovers turn out to be fairly robust determinants of the growth rate. Conditional convergence, on the other hand, emerges as a clear pattern, illustrating that countries with capital stocks below the steady state level are able to grow at a much faster rate. Once the steady state is reached, our results suggest that mainly human capital accumulation and innovations can enhance the growth rate. The robust influence of openness further implies that countries can gain from international trade, as trade facilitates the diffusion of technology between countries. Thus, the results can be interpreted in light of the endogenous growth models with expanding varieties of products, improvements in the quality of products or mutual invention and imitation (see, for instance, Aghion & Howitt, 1992; Jovanovic & Lach, 1991; Romer, 1990; and Segerstrom, 1991) .
The Linkage of Human Capital and Innovations
While the regression results demonstrate that human capital and innovations crucially influence the steady state rate of growth, the evolution of these factors is not independent of one another. Quite the contrary, there is a close connection between the two determinants. Figure 4 shows the average annual TFP growth between 1960 and 1995 and the technological gap in 1995 in a sample of 84 countries. 6 As the United States can be considered the technological leader in the world, we set the theoretical technological front equal to the total factor productivity of the US. The technological gap is the logarithmic distance of the TFP of country i in relation to the TFP of the US, that is T g ≡ log TFP i TFP USA . In many ways, this examination is similar to the catch-up hypothesis originally proposed by Gerschenkron (1962) . Figure 4 illustrates that nations that have been able to close their technological gap did a much better job producing factor productivity growth. Nations that could not catch up with the technology of the US, such as Tanzania or Zambia, possess very poor TFP growth rates. The correlation between the variables in Figure 4 is high (67%). Figure 5 demonstrates the relationship between the average human capital endowment in 1960 and annual factor productivity growth between 1960 and 1995. Human capital is proxied using the average years of schooling. The correlation between the two variables is clearly positive, suggesting that economies with a higher stock of human capital tend to produce higher future rates of factor productivity growth, holding all other determinants constant. Yet the dispersion around the regression line is high. While Asian nations such as Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, Hong Kong and Myanmar have been able to realize above-average TFP growth rates, some South and Central American nations as well as a variety of African states, e.g. Venezuela, Nicaragua, Zambia, Mozambique and Niger, experienced poor TFP increases. The overall correlation of TFP growth and initial human capital is 36%. Figure 5 . Human capital vs. factor productivity growth. Data: Barro and Lee (2010) , Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) , and own calculations.
The connection of human capital and technological progress is crucial when analyzing the evolution of these factors in particular countries, as Figures 4 and 5 indicate that both concepts are not entirely substitutable. In general, progress in the technological front will benefit long-run growth, but it will be of lesser use in countries with relatively small human capital endowment.
Post-war Convergence in Germany
Conditional convergence emerges clearly in each of the regression results in Tables 1 and 2. When trying to explain the evolution of the German growth rate, convergence indeed plays an important role. After the Second World War, the German capital stock was severely destroyed. In the aftermath of the war, German production was only 38% of the prewar level. 7 In accordance with the prediction of the standard growth model and the empirical evidences on conditional convergence, Germany subsequently experienced high growth rates of GDP. Figure 6 demonstrates how GDP growth has developed as the capital stock gradually recovered. The abscissa illustrates the logarithmic distance of output in period t ∈ [1947, ..., 1970] in relation to the prewar level in 1938, that is log GDP t GDP 1938 . The ordinate gives the associated growth rates in t. The correlation is strongly negative (−83%). This indicates that growth rates were exceptionally high when the capital stock was heavily destroyed. Yet as output approximates its prewar level, the growth rates declined. By the end of the 1960s, the effects from convergence expired. This result explains the first major decline of German growth rates around the year 1970. From the 1970s onwards, German output had fully recovered from the effects of the Second World War. The average German growth rate between 1918, the end of the First World War, and 1939, the beginning of the Second World War, was 2.7% per year. 8 Assuming that, without the war, the German economy would have continued to grow at this rate, it is easy to calculate a hypothetical growth path. Comparing the realized output with this hypothetical path shows that production resembled the hypothetical level for the first time in 1971.
This suggests that any comparison of historical growth rates in Germany may only take into consideration the period from 1970 onwards. In addition, it follows that German growth rates may only be compared with per capita increases of developed countries that in turn have already approximated their individual steady state level. For this reason, we analyze the German situation and the development of the crucial determinants of long-run growth within the group of the 25 richest countries of the world.
Germany and the Top 25 Economies
The 25 richest countries in terms of GDP per capita in 2012 were (in descending order) Luxembourg, Qatar, Singapore, Norway, Kuwait, Brunei, Switzerland, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, the Netherlands, Austria, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, Australia, Germany, Belgium, Finland, Iceland, Equatorial Guinea, the United Kingdom, France, Japan and Italy. 9 Germany ranks 17th place in this list. This sample includes some countries whose wealth is based to large parts on oil, such as Brunei, Equatorial Guinea, Qatar and Kuwait. In order to investigate general growth mechanisms, it is sensible to leave these countries out of consideration. Figure 7 illustrates the average annual growth rate of the top 25 economies within the periods 1970-2010 and 1990-2010 . Neglecting the oil-exporting countries, the average growth rate of the top 25 was 1.92% and 1. 49% (1990-2010) respectively. Growth in the developed countries declines in nearly each economy. Only six of the top 25 nations succeeded to grow at an average rate of 2% or higher between 1990 and 2010, two of them only by exporting oil. Obviously, the phenomenon of declining growth rates is not a problem specific to Germany but can be identified in almost all developed countries. Within the group of the top 25, German growth rates correspond almost exactly to the mean (1.83% in 1970-2010 and 1.39% in 1990-2010) . The t-test indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the German growth rate and the mean value of the top 25. 10
Human Capital Accumulation in Germany
One important dimension of human capital is schooling. Yet, it is not only school attainment, but also schooling quality can be expected to influence growth. Especially in the sample of developed countries where school attainment is highly comparable, schooling quality distinguishes the countries. Figure A .2 in the appendix illustrates the link between schooling quality as measured by PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) scores, TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study) scores and the index of cognitive skills of Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) . There is strong evidence that the quality of education determines the level of per capita incomes, supporting the results of the regressions in Tables 1 and 2. Figure 8 shows the differences in schooling quality between the top 25 economies. The dotted line marks the median value of the sample. When analyzing test-scores, there is always a trade-off between the evaluation of future potentials and current abilities. More recent test scores come from students who are still in school and can easily deviate from the average skill level of their parents, weighting any measures more towards students and less towards workers. If a measure seeks to value the skill level of the worker force, then there is no choice but to use older data. Figure 8 illustrates recent scores obtain from the last two PISA waves conducted in 2009 and 2012 as well as from the fifth and latest TIMSS cycle collected in 2011. These measures reflect the potential human capital endowment of future workers. The figure further shows the cognitive skills index from Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) that gives an intuition of the skill level of the worker force. The index uses data from international test scores achieved in math and science between 1964 and 2003 and normalizes the data to match the PISA norm of mean 500 and standard deviation 100, divided by 100. The data are quite surprising, demonstrating that the current average cognitive skills of German workers are behind the median value of the top 25 economies. Apparently, the worker force in countries such as Japan, Switzerland, Singapore, Finland, Australia and Belgium is (much) more educated than in Germany. However, when only accounting for the share of top-performing students, the cognitive skills index shows that Germany (10.5%) ranks above the median (8.80%). This suggests that Germany still has an elite of highly educated individuals, but the mean value of education severely lags behind this level, reflecting a high educational inequality. The data also imply that there will be little change in the future. Consulting the scores obtained in PISA and TIMSS tests that evaluate future potentials, the picture changes only slightly. Whereas the PISA score in science and the TIMSS score in math provide some causes for optimism, Germany still ranks below the median in every other category. Overall, Singapore, Finland, Canada and Japan achieve the highest test scores. Does this result indicate that Germany invests too little in education? Figure A. 3 illustrates that educational expenditures in percentage of GDP in Germany are considerably below the median. It is noticeable, however, that some countries such as Singapore and Japan, whose test results turn out to be very positive, invest a relatively small share of GDP in the education sector. The United States, on the other hand, makes higher investments in the education system than the median. The education outputs nevertheless are below average. These results suggest that a mere increase in educational expenditures does not necessarily lead to an improvement in schooling quality. In general, the correlation between education expenditures is moderate (PISA math: 36%, PISA science: 27%).
The German deficits in human capital accumulation are very likely to sharpen in the future. This becomes clear when consulting some of the crucial variables that influence the individual decision to invest in human capital sketched in Section 2. First, the German population on average is relatively old. Figure A.3 shows that Germany has the second highest fraction of people over 65 years (20.6%), only surpassed by Japan (23.4%). Second, the fertility rate in Germany (1.39) is significantly below the median value (1.87) of the top 25 economies. As denoted in the theoretical section, the decision of an individual to invest in human capital depends on the duration of the payments of the returns to education. As the population ages, these incentives decline. The high average age of the German population reduces the incentives of an individual to invest in his own human capital, while the decline of the fertility rate reduces the potential future human capital stock of the whole economy. Human capital thus will accumulate at an even lower rate in the future. Yet, as the theoretical models considering the technological gap as well as the empirical results suggest, declining rates of human capital accumulation decelerate long-run growth.
The regression in Table 1 furthermore suggests that health is an important dimension of human capital. The most common indicator denoting health is life expectancy. Despite the old population, the average life expectancy in Germany is low and below the median of the top 25 (see Figure A .3 in the appendix). Citizens of countries such as Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan and Switzerland on average are much healthier. Hardly surprising, the oil-exporting countries prove to be major outliers in this statistic, as the wealth of these nations is unequally distributed among the population. For example, the GINI coefficient in Equatorial Guinea is about 50% percent. 11 The considerations above illustrate that human capital consists of an array of different facets, among which schooling quality is only one. Combining schooling quality with health, fertility and demography provides a more detailed index of human capital summarizing the arguments previously expressed. Let μ x and σ x be the empirical mean respectively standard deviation of variable x. We create an index of human capitalh that covers the sum of the normalized distances to the mean value of the key dimensions of 11 See UTIP (2012). human capital as
where MAT denominates the mean value of mathematical skills as measured by PISA and OLD gives the fraction of the population that is of age 65 or older. The normalization of the particular distance ensures that each determinant contributes toh with the same weight, regardless of the underlying scaling. The index is furthermore adjusted by the minimum value of the countries in the sample to fit the domain (0, ∞). Figure 9 plots this measures against the average rate of real per capita GDP growth in the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . The time span ends in 2005 in order to prevent the distortive effects of the financial crisis from influencing the examination. Due to data availability, Figure 9 does not include all the top 25 economies. Nevertheless, Germany performs very poorly in this comparison. The human capital index assumes the second lowest values of all countries in the sample. Only Italy turns out to be less equipped with human capital. The correlation of the human capital index and GDP growth is clearly positive. Yet, there are some interesting outliers: Ireland and Qatar were able to boost production by a rate that considerably exceeds the theoretically possible increase, given their stock of human capital. As for Qatar, it is very likely that the outstanding growth rates can be attributed to the export of oil. On the other hand, countries such as Germany, Japan, Denmark, the United States, Italy and Switzerland grew at a rate that is behind their potential. Even so, if Germany could have managed to realize the full growth potential emerging from the human capital stock, per capita GDP growth would still lag behind. The reason is the potential itself: the low fertility rate, the substandard health, the below-average test scores and the old population lead to a comparatively low value ofh. Neither of these factors can be expected to grow in the medium term. Human capital induced growth potentials in Germany are thus quite small.
Innovation Activity in Germany and the World
The results in Tables 1 and 2 provide strong evidence that the innovation activity exerts a considerable influence on growth. The results also suggest that international spillovers matter and that factor productivity and capital goods may also be imported from abroad, given that domestic human capital is capable of mastering internationally available knowledge. We already mentioned previously that inventions may occur randomly over time. Especially when it comes to GPT, the technological frontier may evolve in leaps and bounds. On the other hand, in times when research only provides little progress, T may develop in small, continuous steps. It is important, however, that the technological front is not country-specific. In fact, if economies and societies are closely linked, T is composed of technological and scientific contributions of a large number of countries. While this potential is equal for each country, the adoption of technology differs between the economies. We already mentioned that the ability to close the technological gap depends on human capital. However, the crucial question here is: how does the potential itself develop and how does factor productivity evolve?
When a new GPT arises, the potential for new capital goods, their improvements and variations increases. The diffusion of technology as discussed in Section 2 indicates that -with some time lag -the number of new capital goods will strongly increase. This, in turn, enables a plurality of improvements and variations κ j . As the costs of investing in κ j are much lower than of investing in j * , the tendencies to adopt entirely new technologies will regress. As the κth step is easier to achieve than the (κ + 1)th step, improving and varying existing capital goods will gradually become more difficult. At some point in time, the prospect of a monopolistic position will encourage entrepreneurs to invest in the pent-up inventions. This consideration has incited a variety of authors, such as Schumpeter (1911 Schumpeter ( , 1939 andin more recent times - Helpman and Trajtenberg (1994) and Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) , to argue for a relapsing development of the innovation activity.
We examine the development of historical innovation activity using patent data from the United States, Germany and the world between 1790 and 2011. The elimination of the trend will be achieved using a polynomial of the functional form log(ρ) t = α + N n=1 β n τ n t + ε t , N = 1, . . . , 4 (6) (2003) and Gordon (2012) . The timing of the emergence of the railroad refers to the invention of the rolled rails, whereas the steam locomotive was developed in 1824. Data: USPTO (2013) and own calculations.
where τ n denominates the nth degree trend variable. The selection of n refers to the minimization of the exceeding probability. The residuals of this estimation illustrate the up-and downturns in innovation activity. In order to smooth short-term fluctuations, we use moving averages of ξ th degree. The innovation index is thus
We mentioned before that the diffusion of GPT can be modeled using a logistic or Gompertz function and that the amount of improvements and variations of that technology follow the first derivative of these functions. Denoting these cycles with κ r , we assume that (t) corresponds to concatenations and overlaps of individual κ r . Figure 10 illustrates the innovation index (t) with ξ = 5 and depicts the time points at which major inventions appeared. The growth of patent applications in the past was evidently subject to strong fluctuations. These fluctuations indeed have strong similarities with the diffusion cycles κ r . Comparing the variations with the occurrence of GPT, it appears that patent applications rose above-average whenever radically new inventions appear. Yet, it emerges as a clear empirical regularity that the increase in patent application occurs only after a time delay of 5-10 years. This lag may occur due to the time requirement for the development of new infrastructure and the necessary skills. The delay militates in favor of a sigmoid shape of the diffusion function of GPT. Some time after the adoption of the new technology, the potential of transfer applications and improvements is exhausted. Endogenous growth models with an expanding variety of products quite clearly demonstrate that this will ipso facto lead to a slowdown in growth. Currently, there is a sharp downturn in the worldwide innovation activity. In fact, Figure 10 illustrates that the innovation index has not reached such a low level since the late 1940s. However, the figure also illustrates that there has been a number of fluctuations in the evolution of (t). Historically, each downward movement could be compensated after some amount of time.
Since different methods of detrending can easily yield divergent results, Figure A .4 in the appendix compares the innovation index (t) with a comparable index using the HP filter. It occurs that the shape of the curve is very similar, although some fluctuations tend to be less pronounced. Figure A .4 furthermore compares (t) with the German innovation index, gathered by applying the same method described above using patent data from Germany. The German index follows (t) with some delay. Yet, at the end of the examination period, the delay shrinks. The time delay between (t) and the German cycle further argues for the sigmoid diffusion of technology. As many inventions depicted in Figure 10 have their origin in the United States, international spillovers cause the innovation index in Germany to rise after a certain amount of time.
What is the growth potential currently provided by the innovation index? Figure 10 clearly demonstrates that the innovation activity has declined since the early 2000s. The HP filtered innovation cycle and the German innovation index (both illustrated in Figure A .4) support this assessment. In addition, Figure 11 shows the innovation index of the world, derived by the method described in equations (6) and (7) using aggregated worldwide patent data. This index reveals a similar turning point in patent application growth around the year 2000. As there may be some arguments that suggest patent data must be considered biased and inappropriate in order to gauge 'real' innovation activity, it is still the only variable available for a huge sample of countries and a sufficiently long time span. Nevertheless, it is useful to compare the results to other innovation indicators to prevent jumping to hasty conclusions. Figure 11 (second part) shows the HP filtered trend of the multifactor productivity in the United States and the top 25 economies. The limited time span refers to the availability of data. As both indicators illustrate a strong negative trend, the downturn strengthens around the year 2000. The short recovery period around 1980 is also very similar to the evolution of (t). At large, the development of the multifactor productivity in the United States and the top 25 economies confirm the hypothesis that innovation activity has declined since the early 2000s. Gordon (2012) argues that faltering innovations are currently leading to a slowdown of the US growth rate, emphatically pointing out that the main impact of the computer and internet (ICT) revolution reached its climax in the dot.com era with the main impact of labor productivity withering away since the early 2000s. Likewise, Cowen (2011) recently brought forward the idea of the 'Great Stagnation'. The main thesis is that the advanced economies during the last 100 years have realized all the productivity gains that are attainable with little effort. However, the factors that drove historical welfare increases are mostly spent, leading to falling rates in both growth and innovation. Our results strongly support these assessments. The consequences for growth in the top 25 and Germany are alarming. Nikulainen and Kulvik (2009) provide some evidence from Finland that nanotechnologies have the potential to be widely applicable and to influence the economies similar to recent GPTs. Youtie et al. (2008a,b ) also come to the conclusion that nanotechnology may be a breakthrough innovation with long-run growth potentials. Figure 10 , however, illustrates that the effects of such a new technology emerge only with a significant time lag. Even if nanotechnological applications were already marketable -which can be called into question -the diffusion process would take years to exert positive effects on long-run growth.
Conclusions: The Explanation of the German Growth Crisis
Considering the findings of this paper, we can summarize the explanation of the German growth crisis as follows. First, the high rates of per capita growth during the 1950s and 1960s must almost entirely be attributed to conditional convergence. As these effects expired in the early 1970s, the German growth rate declined significantly and settled at a more or less stable level at about 2% per year. Economists have long considered this rate as the German steady state growth rate of income. Yet, it turns out that this rate refers to a period in which technical knowledge evolves at an above average rate. As innovation activity had declined by the year 2000, so had growth rates. There is much evidence that the global economy is running out of radically new ideas that enable the creation of new growth-boosting capital goods, their improvements and varieties. The positive effects of the ICT-revolution have vanished, as most of the inventions that replaced repetitive and tedious clerical work have been adopted. More recent ICT innovations are concerned with the exchange of information, but as further speed-ups in communication are hard to achieve, given the already high level of electronic integration, there is no more fundamental influence on productivity. The declining potential provided by the technological front has led to a transnational cutback in growth rates across the developed economies.
Yet, considering the case of Germany, there is a further alarming development: human capital turns out to exert a strong influence on growth, partly because it operates as a direct input factor in the production function, partly because it enables an economy to close the technological gap. Germany, however, severely lags behind the group of the top 25 economies in terms of human capital accumulation. Analyzing the test scores of PISA and TIMSS as well as the cognitive skills measured by Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) , Germany is clearly behind the mean value. The demographic development gives reason to suspect that human capital increases in the future will be even lower.
The combination of human capital and innovations explains the German situation quite well: the backlog in human capital leads to mediocre growth rates within the sample of the 25 richest countries of the world. However, most developed economies on their part struggle with the absence of radically new ideas, leading to a decline in both innovation activity and long-run growth potential. Increasing human capital would enhance German growth and improve the position in the group of developed countries. Even so, the potential for growth is restricted by the evolution of the technological front. As the innovation index suggests that improvements and variations of existing goods currently require great effort, the incentives to invest in entirely new technologies may eventually begin to rise. Nanotechnology is already considered a new GPT with profound economic potential. If its positive effects reach the economies, growth rates similar to those between 1970 and 2000 may easily be possible after some time delay. Yet, the idea of a future phase of prosperity as experienced by Germany in the 1950s and 1960s still remains Utopian at best. 
